The ethics ofsociety rather than medical ethics Andrew Smith Department ofFamily and Community Medicine, The Medical School, Newcastle upon Tyne Medicine's right to determine its own code of professional conduct used to be generally accepted because it was thought that doctors alone had the technical knowledge to understand the issues involved. This code of ethics has evolved over the centuries from the Hippocratic Oath and is about the relationship between doctors and patients. It is embodied in the Handbook of Medical Ethics published by the British Medical Association (BMA) which is written by doctors for doctors. The public have no say in medical ethicsthough recently the BMA has been trying to involve the public more.
Ian Kennedy in his I980 Reith Lectures (i) 
involve the public in the debate. He went on to suggest ways of doing so. They included making the Handbook ofMedical Ethics generally available and providing forums for doctors and members of the public to discuss the issues and allow a consensus to emerge (3). Ian Kennedy agreed with the need to foster public participation. The trouble is that this takes time and the issue has become more urgent since the judge in the Arthur case established the legal standing of medical ethics. He said: 'Whatever ethics a profession might evolve, they could not stand up in court or survive if they were in conflict with the law' (4).
But where does the law now stand? Dr Arthur's acquittal created no precedent because of the baby's early death from natural causes. The next paediatrician who decides not to treat a malformed baby rejected by its parents is likely to face the same charge of murder. Unless, that is, autopsy reveals congenital defects incompatible with life. A baby with spina bifida, for example, may live a kind oflife for years so that ifit dies within days the paediatrician who did not treat it is likely to be accused of killing it. 'An intention to allow a child to die much sooner than it would have done, not simply a matter ofhours but ofdays or weeks is liable to lead to a criminal charge' (5) . Getting the agreement of other paediatricians about this course of action or basing the opinion on medical ethics will not avail him if medical ethics won't stand up in court.
Doctors other than paediatricians are involved in decisions about shortening the life of the patient. General practitioners, after discussing with relatives the issue of withholding treatment from terminally ill patients who develop chest infections, often do not prescribe an antibiotic which is clinically indicated. Some, after treatment to relieve intractable pain or extreme distress in a terminally ill patient has failed, have on occasion administered a lethal dose of morphia. Others, unwilling to administer such an injection are forced to watch their patients die slowly because of a misplaced belief that the sanctity of life is absolute. In Victorian times, a predominantly Christian country did regard it as absolute -except, of course, in the case ofmembers of the armed forces serving in a just war -but many people today hold to a utilitarian ethic and consider the issue in the context of overall harm and benefit. Some moral philosophers see no intrinsic moral distinction between killing a person with an incurable disease and allowing him or her to die in distress. They believe that faced with inevitable death doctors should ensure that it comes in the best possible way (6) .
In law, however, deliberate administration of lethal doses of morphia is regarded as murder. But what about withholding antibiotics from a terminally ill patient when this is likely to lead to the patient's death days or weeks or even months sooner than otherwise? So long as the law remains obscure on this point doctors who are prepared to ensure an easier death for their patients are less likely to do so for fear of prosecution by organisations such as LIFE.
The best answer to the problem, it seems to me, is to legislate. The Abortion Act of I967 is a good precedent for this. Termination ofpregnancy, which had hitherto been a criminal act, was legalised and the conditions under which it became permissible to kill a fetus were laid down clearly in the Act. It was a good example of the public, represented by their elected members of parliament, providing, in Kennedy's words, 'the moral and ethical framework within which doctors might legitimately use their technical and clinical skills'. The majority of doctors involved -general practitioners and gynaecologists -were against the Act at the time it became law. Now opinion polls show that most of them are in favour ofit and against any attempt to dilute it. A similar sort of Act setting out the conditions under which it was permissible to shorten life might well resolve our present difficulties.
Whether or not these difficulties are resolved, the present debate provides an overwhelming case for teaching ethics in medical schools. The General Medical Council (GMC) recommended in I967 that medical ethics should be added to the undergraduate curriculum. Many schools claim that the subject is now included but few medical students are conscious of ever having been taught it. However, even if medical ethics were to be effectively taught it would be inadequate. Medical ethics are a professional code decided by doctors for doctors. They won't stand up in court. What needs to be taught is the ethics of society as a whole and this can be done only by bringing in specialists in moral philosophy and ethical analysis. They would not only clarify the distinction between ethical and medical decisions which confuses many doctors but would bring a leavening of the humanities into a science-based curriculum. Such study might even make medicine more of a learned profession and less of a scientific technocracy.
